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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
Admitting the necessity for a reformation, or at least a control, of
our law enforcement methods, the writer cannot help but conclude
that judicial legislation on a principle repeatedly rejected by the
legislature is not the answer. It is the writer's position that the view
taken by the Missouri courts that illegal detention has no place in
the test of voluntariness is correct.
R. W. GILcREST
COMMENTS
EVIDENCE--PROCEDURE-DIsCOVERY NOT PERMITTED OF PHOTO-
GRAPHS TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AFTER ACCIDENT
State ex rel. Terminal Ry. Assn. of St. Louis v. Flynn,
. 257 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. 1953)
Davis sued relator for injuries sustained in an accident which
occurred while he was employed by relator. By a pre-trial motion
Davis sought discovery of four photographs that had been taken by
one of relator's claim agents immediately after the accident. The
motion for discovery was sustained by the trial court. Relator brought
an original proceeding in prohibition in the Missouri Supreme Court
to prevent the issuance of the order. The court granted prohibition
and held that the photographs were exempt from discovery because
they constituted a privileged communication made by an agent not in
the regular course of business but in preparation for the defense of
reasonably anticipated litigation."
A litigant will not be forced to produce a document for discovery
if at the trial he could refuse to disclose its contents on the ground
that it would violate the attorney-client privilege.2 The fact that a
client has given his lawyer a document will not be sufficient in itself to
make the document exempt from discovery. As Professor Wigmore
points out, the lawyer is not being asked to testify as to what his client
1. State ez rel. Terminal Ry. Assn. of St. Louis v. Flynn, 257 S.W.2d 69
(Mo. 1953). The court order was issued pursuant to Mo. REV. STAT. § 510.030
(1949 pon motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice
to all other parties, the court in which an action is pending may
(1) Order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying
or photographing, by or on behalf of the moving party, of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible
things, not privileged, which constitute or contain evidence material to any
matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody, or
control ....
For an excellent discussion of discovery procedure in Missouri, see Crawford,
Written Interrogatories to Parties Under the Missouri Code, 1953 WAsH. U.L.Q. 1.
2. State ex rel. Chicago, R. I. & P. R.R. v. Woods, 316 Mo. 1032 292 S. W.
1033 (1927); In re Hyde, 149 Ohio St. 407, 79 N.E.2d 224 (19493; Cully v.
Northern Pac. R.R., 35 Wash. 241, 77 Pac. 202 (1904).
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told him, but is only being asked to produce a physical object, the
document itself., The lawyer can refuse to produce the document only
if his client could claim that the document is a privileged communica-
tion.4 Unless the document was intentionally prepared by the client as
a communication to the lawyer it is not a confidential communication
and the client has no privilege. A document prepared by the client's
agent is privileged only if it was prepared as an aid in securing legal
advice and not as an ordinary business record.6
There is a split of authority as to whether an accident report is
privileged when it is made by an agent immediately after an accident
before legal advice is sought or litigation is threatened. Some courts
have held that such a report is privileged because it was prepared in
reasonable anticipation of litigation.7 Other courts, including the
federal courts (reflecting their liberal discovery policy), have held
that these facts alone do not establish any privilege8 The party claim-
ing the privilege has the burden of proving that the report was pre-
pared for the bona fide purpose of being sent to an attorney for advice
and that it was not prepared as an ordinary business record.9 The fact
that it was prepared after an accident and that the agent might have
had some suspicion that litigation might result is not sufficient to
establish the privilege; the preparation might have been part of the
usual business routine intended for use as data for statistical studies
or to fill out required accident reports for the government.10
In addition to the exemption given to confidential communications,
there is a recent trend toward the exemption from discovery of ma-
terial that was compiled in the actual preparation of a client's case.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Hickman v. Taylor,"1 held
that in addition to the exemption of privileged communications a
3, 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307 (3d ed. 1940).
4. Andrews v. Ohio & Mississippi R.R., 14 Ind. 169 (1860); Jones v. Reilly,
174 N.Y. 97, 66 N.E. 649 (1903); in re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d
550 (194I9).
5. 8 WIGM.ORE, EVIDENCE § 2307 (3d ed. 1940).
6. Wise v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 Atl. 640 (1935);
Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
New York Casualty Co. v. Superior Court of San Francisco, 30 Cal. App.
2d 130, 85 P.2d 965 (1938) ; Atlantic Coast Ry. v. Williams, 21 Ga. App. 453, 94
S.E. 584 (1917); In re Keough, 151 Ohio St. 307, 85 N.E.2d 550 (1949).
8. Kulich v. Murray, 28 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Wise v. Western Union
Telvenaph Co.. 36 Del. 456, 178 Atl. 640 (1935); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181
Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
!). Wi, v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 36 Del. 456, 178 Atl. 640 (1935);
Stat. - P. Terminal Ry. Assn. v. Flynn, 257 S.W.2d 69 (Mo. 1953) ; Robertson v.
Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943).
W *. Robertson v. Conunonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943). See
Morgan, Law of E idence, 1941-45, 59 HARV. L. Rv. 490, 566 (1946), where he
criticizes the holding in Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943), that carrier
reports cquired by law were not made in the course of normal employment and
therefore id not fall under the business record exception to the hearsay rule.
1]. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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special exemption from discovery should be given to the work prod-
uct of an. attorney in the preparation of his case. This exemption,
unlike the one accorded confidential communications, is conditional
and does not apply if the party requesting discovery can show special
hardship.
The Missouri Supreme Court has held that only evidence admis-
sible at trial is open to discovery, and that evidence subject to objec-
tion is exempt.12 In State ex rel. Miller's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Ca-
ruhers,28 the Missouri Court adopted the theory of the Hickman case
and held that the special exemption given to the work product of the
lawyer extends to the work of claim agents when they are aiding in
the preparation of a case.
It is not clear whether the principal case was decided on the basis
that the photographs were a privileged communication or on the basis
that they were the work product of an agent in preparation for litiga-
tion. The opinion included both a discussion of privileged reports
not made in the normal course of business and also a citation to the
Caruthers case as a precedent in Missouri for exemption of evidence
under the theory of the Hickman case. The Caruthers case was con-
cerned with exempting evidence from discovery that did not con-
stitute a privileged communication. Once the court in the principal
case had decided that the agent was not acting in the normal course
of business and that the photographs were exempt as a privileged
communication, there was no need to invoke the special exemption
found in the Caruthers case. Moreover there was no indication in the
opinion in the principal case that discovery would be allowed even if
special hardship were shown. This limitation is an essential element
of the Hickman concept but is inapplicable to privileged communica-
tions. It is therefore submitted that the court actually exempted the
photographs from discovery as confidential communications, not as
the work product of the lawyer.
By this decision the Supreme Court of Missouri has thus restricted
discovery, at least in the case of railway agents' reports. 14 It is sug-
12. State ex rel. Miller's Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Caruthers, 360 Mo. 8, 226
S.W.2d 711 (1950); State ex rel. Kansas City Public Service Co. v. Cowan, 356
Mo. 674, 203 S.W.2d 407 (1947) ; State ex rel. Thompson v. Harris, 355 Mo. 176,
195 S.W.2d 645 (1946). See Crawford, supra note 1, at 11, where the writer
advocates the more liberal federal rule which would permit discovery of any
evidence that might be admissible evidence, F. R. Civ. P. 26 (b). (This rule
does not affect the exemption of privileged communications.)
13. 360 Mo. 8, 226 S.W.2d 711 (1950). The federal courts have not seen fit
to extend any special exemption to the work of agents. Hughes v. Pennsylvania
R.R., 7 F.R.D. 737 (E.D.N.Y. 1948). See Note, 62 HARV. L. RBV. 269 (1948),
where it is suggested that the exemption has not been extended to agents because
the courts have felt that discovery is not the same deterrent to their investigations
that it might be to a lawyer. Florida has exempted agents' reports from dis-
covery. Sea Board Air Line v. Timmons, 61 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1952).
14. See note 7 supra.
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gested that this is an unfortunate step backward in view of the mod-
ern trend towards greater discovery, and the fact that one of the pur-
poses underlying this trend has been to equalize the opportunities of
large corporate defendants and less pecunious plaintiffs to obtain the
facts needed to present their respective cases.1 3
TORTS-NVRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS-PRENATAL INJURIES
Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953)
A car negligently operated by the defendant collided with the car
of a pregnant woman. The child was born alive but subsequently died
as a result of injuries allegedly sustained in the accident. Suit was
brought against the defendant under the Missouri "wrongful death"
statute., The trial court dismissed the case for failure to state a cause
of action. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and held that
since a child may maintain a suit for negligently caused injuries re-
ceived while viable and en ventre sa mere, under the statute the re-
presentatives of the child may recover where the injury results in
death?
Most courts do not allow recovery for the negligent injury of an
unborn child.;; In the leading case of Dietrich v. Inhabitants of North-
ampton4, Mr. Justice Holmes, denying recovery for prenatal injuries,
reasoned that the unborn child is part of the mother, that the mother
can recover for injuries not too remote, and that therefore the child
need not recover. Other reasons which have been advanced for the
denial of recovery are: that there is no person in existence to whom
a duty could be owed at the time of the accident ;, that to allow re-
covery would increase the probability of false claims ;( that there was
no common law right of action, and the right, if created, should arise
1,5. Martin v. Lingle Refrigeration Co., 260 S.W.2d 562 (Mo. 1953). This recent
case apparently cited the principal case as holding that the photographs were
exempt as a privileged communication.
1. Mo. REv. STAT. § 537.080 (1949):
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, and the act, neglect or default is such as would, if
death had not ensued, have entitled the party injured to maintain an action
and recover damages in respect thereof, then, and in every such case, the
person who or the corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued shall be liable to an action for damages, notwithstanding the death
of the person injured. [Italics added.]
2. Steggall v. Morris, 258 S.W.2d 577 (Mo. 1953).
;. RESTATEMENT, TORTs § 869 (1939): "A person who negligently causes harm
to an unborn child is not liable to such child for the harm." See 12 M. L. Ruv.
223, 224 (1951), for an enumeration of the few jurisdictions which allow recovery.
4. 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
. PRoSSE8, ToRrs 188-190 (1941).
6. Bliss v. Passanesi, 95 N.E.2d 206 (Mass. 1950).
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